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STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an appeal from a non-jury verdict of guilty
on the charge of theft by receiving under 76-6-408(1), (2) (a)
(b), Utah Code Annotated (Supp. 1973).
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The defendant was convicted of theft by receiving
of goods having a value of more than $250.00 but less than
$1,000.00, a felony of the third degree.

Defendant was sen-

tenced to an indeterminate term of zero to five years in the
Utah State Prison and fined $500.00.

Defendant was placed on

probation for two years provided the fine was paid.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant seeks a reversal of the non-jury verdict
with directions from this court to dismiss the charges against
her based on the point raised on appeal.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The State and defendant stipulated (R. 51) to the
following facts for purposes of this appeal as follows:
Defendant was charged with the offense of theft by
receiving, a second degree felony.

She was found guilty of that
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charge, but because of some conflict in the estimates of
value of the property involved, the offense was determined
to be a third degree felony.

The evidence supporting the

finding by the trial court, sitting without a jury, was as
follows:
1. William Barkley had stolen from his automobile
on December 1, 1973, a small electric calculator, Exhibit 11.
Larry J. Baker had stolen from him on August 21, 1974, an
electrician's hand tool, Exhibit 12.
2.

On or about August 25, 1974, Intermountain

Glass Company in Salt Lake City was burglarized, and numerous
hand tools were stolen. Appellant, with her husband, owns a
ranch in Duchesne County, Utah, and residing at the ranch are
Appellant with her husband, the appellant's divorced daughter,
and the daughter's school aged children.
3. A search warrant issued in October 1974 which
was timely served on the premises of the ranch in the absence
of Appellant but while her husband was present.
4.

During the above search Exhibits 11 and 12 were

recovered along with the personalty described in the return to
the search warrant and portrayed in the pictures which were
received as exhibits in this case, the documentary exhibits
being made part of the record on appeal to the Supreme Court.
Based on information supplied to the Salt Lake County Sheriff's
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Office by an informant on the search warrant that the Intermountain Glass tools had been sold to Appellant, and that she
had been told of their origin, which Appellant denied during
the trial, and based upon the finding of Exhibits 11 and 12
during the course of the search of the ranch in Duchesne County,
Utah, Appellant was charged with the felony offense of theft
by receiving.
POINT ON APPEAL
SECTION 76-6-408, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED
(SUPP. 1973) IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL
The pertinent provisions of the Utah Code in issue
in this case are as follows:
"76-6-408(1). A person commits theft if
he receives, retains, or disposes of the property
of another knowing that it has been stolen, or who
conceals, sells, withholds or aids in concealing,
selling, or withholding any such property from the
owner, knowing the property to be stolen, with a
purpose to deprive the owner thereof.
(2) The knowledge or belief required for
paragraph (1) is presumed in the case of an actor
who:
(a) Is found in possession or control
of other property stolen on a separate occasion; or
(b) Has received other stolen property
within the year preceeding the receiving
offense charged; ... (Emphasis added.)"
Appellant contends the presumption created by this
statute is unconstitutional in that it: (1) violates her right
to a presumption of innocence and the corollary right that the
State prove every element of the offense beyond a reasonable
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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doubt as embodied in Section 77-31-4 UCA (1953) and as
demanded by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment; (2) violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment and the similar provision in Article I, Section 7
of the Utah State Constitution, as being overly broad and
vaguely drawn, and (3) it violates the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment as contrary to Supreme Court
decisions in Leary v. United States, 395 U.S. 6, 89 S. Ct.
1532, 23 L. Ed. 2d 57 (1969), Turner v. United States, 396
U.S. 398, 90 S. Ct. 642, 24 L. Ed. 2d 610 (1970), Barnes v.
United States, 412 U.S. 837, 93 S. Ct. 2357, 37 L. Ed. 2d
380 (1973) .
In Leary, supra, the court was faced with a narcotics statute that created a presumption of knowledge on the
part of the accused.

In determining the validity of the pre-

sumption, the court said:
"With regard to the knowledge 1 presumption, we believe that Tot / Tot v. United
States, 319 U.S. 463, 63 S^ Ct. 1241, 87 L. Ed.
1519 ( 1 9 4 3 ) J and Romano / United States v.
Romano, 382 U^S. 136, 86 S. Ct. 279, 15 L. Ed.
2d 210 (1965)_/ require that we take the statute
at face value and ask whether it permits conviction upon insufficient proof of 'knowledge1.
(395 U.S. 6 at 37) (Citations added.)
Following the Supreme Court's reasoning we must
take Section 76-6-408 at face value and examine its language
and what it permits the trier of fact to do and on what evidence.
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The statute requires at least two elements to be
shown without question: (1) that the defendant was in possession of stolen goods, and (2) that defendant knew the
goods were stolen. When the presumption is to be used,
element # 2 is established by proof that defendant was in
possession or control of property stolen on an occasion different from the one for which defendant is charged or that
defendant received this other property within the year preceeding the offense charged.

The practical effect is this:

if the State cannot prove knowledge or its evidence is
questionable or insufficient, all it need prove is other
possession and the presumption attaches.
It has been consistently held that a showing of
mere possession without more cannot substantiate a presumption of guilt as established by similar statutes.

See, e.g.

Commonwealth of Pennsylvania v. Sheppard, 229 Pa. Super. 42,
324 A. 2d 522 (1974), State of Oregon v. Offord, 14 Or. App.
195, 512 P. 2d 1375 (1973) and cases cited therein. Furthermore, it has been held that in order for the presumption to
be constitutional, the fact proved must show beyond a reasonable
doubt that the presumed fact is true. United States v. Johnson,
140 U.S. App. D.C. 54, 433 F. 2d 1160 (1970), Wilbur v. Mullaney,
473 F. 2d 943 (1st Cir. 1973), State v. Odom, 83 Wash. 2d 541,
520 P. 2d 152 (1974).
in opposite.

Barnes v. United States, supra, is not

In that case the Supreme Court was not faced with
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a statute creating a presumption of guilt but with a common
law rule of evidence creating an inference from all the surrounding circumstances.

The court said after examining the

cases and the historical basis of the rule:
"This impressive historical basis, however, is not in itself sufficient to establish
the instructions constitutionality. Common-law
inferences, like their statutory counterparts,
must satisfy due process standards in light of
present-day experience." (412 U.S. 837 at 845)
The instruction given by the trial judge in Barnes, supra,
reads in part:
"However, you are never required to make
this inference. It is the exclusive province of
the jury to determine whether the facts and circumstances shown by the evidence in this case warrant any inference which the law permits the jury
to draw from the possession of recently stolen
property." (412 U.S. 837 at 840, n. 3) (Emphasis
added.)
In upholding the instruction as given, the court
reviewed the evidence and found that both sides agreed defendant was in possession of four recently stolen treasury checks;
that payees of those checks had never received them; that a
government witness, an expert in handwriting, testified that
defendant had endorsed all four checks with his pseudonym and
had also endorsed the name of the payee on two of the checks;
that defendant testified he received the checks from people who
sold furniture for him door to door, but that he could not name
or identify any of the sales people; that defendant admitted
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writing his pseudonym on each check; that defendant could not
substantiate any furniture orders because the orders had been
written on sratch paper which was not kept.
"Such evidence was clearly sufficient
to enable the jury to find beyond a reasonable
doubt that petitioner knew the checks were
stolen." (412 U.S. 837 at 845)
The result in Barnes, supra, is similar to the
result reached by the Utah Supreme Court in State v. Martinez,
21 Ut.2d 187, 442 P. 2d 943 (1968), where in interpreting 76-38-1
UCA (1953) and the language "prima facie evidence" the court found
the statute created nothing more than a rule of evidence.

It still

was incumbent on the trier of fact to decide from the evidence
whether or not an inference should be drawn.

The trier of fact

was not forced to make the inference but could if he wished.
The "inference" or "prima facie evidence" rule has been upheld
in virtually every jurisdiction with statutes of similar wording.
This rule differs from the "presumption" rule now before us.
State v. Georgopoulous, 27 Ut. 2d 53, 492 P. 2d 13 53
(1972) in determining the admissibility of evidence of other
stolen property for purposes of 76-38-12 UCA (1953) fits this
pattern.

The former 76-38-12 did not create any presumption.

But the Utah Supreme Court allowed the evidence of other stolen
goods to be admitted at the trial.

This court held that this

evidence could be used by the jury to help it decide if the
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defendant knew that the goods for which he was arrested
were stolen. Again, the court has created a rule of evidence which permits the jury to reach its own judgment as to
whether or not defendant had knowledge, i.e. to reach a permissible inference.

Barnes, supra, would further require that

the evidence be sufficient beyond a reasonable doubt.
These rules are completely evaded by Section 76-6408, the statute now under consideration.

The statute does not

provide for any rule of evidence but rather provides for a legal
presumption of knowledge and by virtue of the wording of the
statute a presumption of guilt.
It is apparent from the abbreviated record in this
case that Judge Baldwin at the time of making his finding of
guilty (R. 55) considered the "presumption" rule in the literal
interpretation of the subject statute

without regard to any

number of standards considered by other courts in determining
the sufficiency of proof.

The court stated (P. 55):

"I have to weigh the evidence. I
think that Mr. Van Over and Mr. Brown have
told a lot of falsehoods. (Paragraph 4 of
stipulated statement of facts that the defendant had been told of the origin of the stolen
tools from Intermountain Glass). On the other
hand, maybe some of it has some ring of truth.
The fact that that much property was delivered
(by Van Over and Brown), placed in a garage
(the defendant's) and sold (to the defendant),
in effect sight-unseen for $250, with no
questions, who, how, why, when or where,
couples together with whether it's possession or control or of other items stolen on
several occasions in the home, I assume one
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has control of one's own home even though
someone else is living there; the bedroom,
I have to find those other two items were
stolen and end up in the possession of —
I didn't say the ultimate possession of —
of the defendant. The court, based upon
the presumptions (statutory) , I would have
to find the defendant guilty of receipt of
property of a value of less than $1,000 and
over $250." (Emphasis added.)
Whether or not "presumption vs. inference" is
constitutional at all is discussed in detail in "The Unconstitutionality of Statutory Criminal Presumptions" Vol. 22, Stanford
Law Review, page 341. At page 349, the writer notes the basic
objections to such legal presumptions when he states (1) they
permit verdicts based upon evidence insufficient to support a
finding beyond a reasonable doubt; (2) they force the jury to
make arbitrary decisions, and (3) they direct verdicts for the
prosecution unconstitutionally.
The writer further notes that when presumptions only
have to pose the "rationale-connection test", a jury could
find a person guilty on a quantum of evidence less than proof
beyond a reasonable doubt of each and every element of the offense. As in Leary, supra, Appellant here was found guilty
because of a statutory presumption of knowledge, an instance
in which the State Legislature attempted to nullify the presumption of innocence which is the highest and greatest presumption in the law.

It would appear that State v. Georgopoulous,

su£ra, and the permissible inference allowed by this Court have
now been overridden.
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It is obvious from Judge Baldwin's comments (TR. 55)
that the sellers of the personalty to Appellant were of questionable reliability.

It is further obvious from his comment

"Based upon the presumptions..." that we have a presumptive
questionable statute and no standard or criterion for overcoming this very questionable practice in the law.

Creating a

presumption of knowledge of an act which occurs today based
upon possession of other stolen property twenty years before
or possession of property stolen 364 days beforehand does not
necessarily to the exclusion of any other reasonable hypothesis
even infer guilty knowledge.

To do so is a clear violation of

the concepts enunciated by the court in In re Winship, 397 U.S.
358, 90 S. Ct. 1068, 25 L. Ed. 2d 368 (1970) that the State
must prove every element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.
Even accepting completely the State proved possession it does
not necessarily follow that such possession proves beyond a
reasonable doubt that knowledge was had, in violation of United
States v. Johnson, supra, and violates the accepted rule that
possession can substantiate a finding of guilt which the statute
allows.

This statute has taken a rule of evidence in the Utah

case of Georgopoulous, supra, and turned it into a presumption
of guilt.
Leary, supra, has made it abundantly clear that before
a statutory presumption can be constitutionally valid the State
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must prove that the fact presumed must lead at least with
"substantial assurance" to the presumed fact.
The court quoted Tot, supra;
"...The Court held that because of
the danger of overreaching it was incumbent
upon the prosecution to demonstrate that the
inference was permissible before the burden
of coming forward could be placed upon the
defendant." (395 U.S. 6 at 45)
In the Tot, supra, case the court was faced with a
rule of evidence that a jury could infer from possession of
a firearm that it came in interstate commerce.

It should be

remembered that this was only a permissible inference. The
jury did not have to infer this knowledge.

Only if the sur-

rounding circumstances and evidence warranted the inference
in the minds of the jury need they so infer.

But in the case

at bar the presumption is demanded as the trial judge felt
bound to so presume.

This statute does not create a permis-

sible inference but a mandatory presumption as evidenced by
the trial judge's statement.
Following the rule of Leary and Turner, supra, it
would appear that buyers of personalty must make an indepth
investigation into the ownership, identity and source of all
purchased goods. Even then an innocent buyer would not be
protected because of the statutory presumption because of the
unavailable criterion in this attempt to shift the burden of
proof.
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CONCLUSION
There being no evidence that the legislative logic
set forth in 76-6-408, UCA as amended, is necessarily true,
i.e. that a person who possessed a stolen object on another
occasion or possessed an object stolen within a year from
the time he received a second stolen object, knew that the
second object was stolen.

The statute in question sets forth

no reasonable standard to create a statutory presumption of
knowledge. Likewise, such a presumption is unconstitutional
as it violates the basic premise that a person is presumed
guilty until each and every element of the offense is established by direct or reasonably inferable conclusionable evidence beyond a reasonable doubt under the facts and circumstances applicable to the cause before this court. Appellant
respectfully requests the statutory presumption be struck down
by this court as being contrary to the objection of this State
and of the United States.
Respectfully submitted,
HATCH, McRAE & RICHARDSON

B

Y.
Robert M. McRae
Attorney for DefendantAppellant
370 East Fifth South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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